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ABSTRACT 
When looking at the different effects of institutional quality on economic development, 
namely control of corruption, there are two different hypotheses that explain such effects. 
One is the “grease the wheel” hypothesis, which predicts that corruption is beneficial for 
growth, and the other one is the “sand the wheel” hypothesis, which says the opposite. 
Corruption is normally blamed for the slow economic growths in some countries, but 
some Asian countries’ exponential growths have proven the “grease the wheel” 
hypothesis otherwise. The “Asian experience”1 phenomenon occurs when corruption 
does not seem to hamper business activities in some Asian countries. This research will 
focus on finding how institutional quality variables, such as corruption control and 
government effectiveness, can correlate with innovation variables to contribute to 
economic growth. Using data and examples from Asian countries, this study finds a 
positive correlation between corruption and economic growth in some developed 
countries, such as China and South Korea. 
 
  
JEL Classification: D73, F43, O19 
 
Keywords: Asia, ASEAN, Corruption, Economic Growth, Innovation, Institutional 
Quality 
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1 Kaufmann and Wei, 1999 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Institutional quality includes many different areas, such as control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, and political stability. However, since corruption is a 
macroeconomic problem that almost every national government has to deal with, this 
study is going to focus mostly on the effect of corruption on economic development. The 
term corruption covers a broad range of actions, which directly translates to the action of 
abusing public power for private gain. According to the World Bank, corruption can 
include the following activities: bribery in the public sector, theft of state assets by 
officials, political patronage, or corruption in private sector. 
Theoretically, corruption creates inefficiency, slows down growth and hampers 
developing progresses. When looking at economic study, corruption is normally named 
as the main reason that causes slow economic growth in countries in Africa, South East 
Asia and Eastern Europe. However, is corruption actually bad for economic development 
for all countries in the world? When looking at recent trends in some developed Asian 
countries, such as China, South Korea and India, the data shows otherwise. Those 
countries are growing exponentially in the past ten years even though their corruption 
perception indexes are pretty low.  
Even though there are various studies on this topic in Asian region, the results 
vary. There are studies that explain why some countries would benefit from corruption, 
while there are other studies that blame corruption for the slow economic growth. This 
study aims at studying the relationship between institutional quality variables and 
innovation variables on growth in Asian countries. This research will test the hypothesis 
Innovation and Institutional Quality on Economic Growth in Asia 
Senior Capstone Project for Nguyen Tran-Nguyen 
! 3 
that corruption network can encourage more innovation in a country and hence, improve 
economic conditions. From a policy perspective, this study is important because this 
proves that corruption is not necessarily a bad institutional quality variable for all 
development. There is no “one-size-fits-all” approach for economic development that can 
be applied to every country. Policy makers and economics reformers should take into 
considerations different areas that could help economic development, rather than just 
focus on slashing corruption.  
In addition, this paper is contributes to the literature on the subject to comply 
different kinds of study to prove the “grease the wheel” hypothesis. First, this study 
separates the data set into two sub sets based on GDP per capita: developed countries and 
developing countries. Then, it examines the correlation between corruption and economic 
development through innovation, as well as possible explanations for such patterns in 
those countries. 
The structure of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 describes the current 
economic trends in Asian countries in recent years. Literature review is on section 3. 
Section 4 explains the data and empirical model use in this study, where empirical results 
will be presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the study, 
following by the appendices and bibliography. 
2.0 CURRENT TRENDS 
2.1 Current Growth Trend 
With the slowdown in world leading economies, namely the United States and 
Europe, Asian countries are experiencing spillover effects from the global financial crisis 
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(GFC). According to a report by the IMF, as of January 2014, both China and India have 
shown declining growth since the GFC. In China, growth has slowed from a rate of above 
10 percent to below 8 percent in the past two years. Likewise, India’s growth has slowed 
from 8 percent to 6 percent during the same period. Some economists believe that those 
slowdowns reflect structural factors and the “middle-income trap”2. 
Figure 1: Trend Growth Across Countries (Average across methods; in percent)
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook; World Development Indicators; CEIC data 
Company Ltd.; Haver Analytics; U.N. Population Database; and IMF Staff Calculations. 
1 1993-1997 average excludes 1997 as Thailand's pre-crisis boom ended in 1996. 
2 PPP GDP weighted average used for ASEAN 5. 
Overall, different reports consistently point to a gradual decline in growth trend in 
recent years in Asia. China’s growth peaked around 2006-2007 at around 11 percent, and 
then slowly decline to 8 percent in 2013. Similarly, India’s growth peaked at 8 percent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Middle-income trap: a phenomenon of rapidly growing economies stagnating at middle-income 
levels and failing to graduate into the ranks of high-income countries (IMF Working Paper, 
WP/14/2) 
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before the GFC, and then gradually declined to 6 percent. ASEAN 53, as a whole, shows 
little changes since the GFC. This reflects “strong domestic demand, intra-regional 
integration, improved governance and structural reforms” (Anand et al., 2014, p. 7). 
However, there is some disparity across the different countries in the group. 
Indonesia has been showing strong growth and it has been shielded from global 
shocks. After the Asian crisis in the 1990s, Indonesian’s economy has been showing a 
steady upward trend, with the highest in 2011-2012. Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand also show a growing trend, but less significant. Only the Philippines growth rate 
surpassed its pre-GFC rate because of their low trade and financial openness. On the 
other hand, Malaysia and Thailand are still recovering after the crisis. Lastly, Vietnam’s 
growth is declining since the GFC and is currently estimated to be at the lowest since 
1990. A more detailed graph of trend growth estimates for individual country is shown in 
Figure 2.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 ASEAN 5 countries include: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
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Figure 2: Trend Growth Estimates (In percent) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook; World Development Indicators; CEIC data 
Company Ltd.; Haver Analytics; U.N. Population Database; and IMF Staff calculations. 
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2.2 Current Corruption Trend 
According to the most recent Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency 
International in 20144, out of the 28 Asian Pacific countries in the survey, a majority of 
Asian countries are lagging behind in their fighting corruption efforts. About 18 out of 28 
countries’ CPIs score are less than 40 out of 1005. Philippines and Thailand both scored 
38, Indonesia scored 34, Myammar scored 21. Whether or not the low scores are results 
of corruption or the government’s accountability, persistent low scores call to attention to 
the leadership and government management of Asian countries as corruption can pose a 
threat to sustainability of their somewhat fragile economies. 
In 2014, the Chinese government is making a commitment to fight and prosecute 
corruption due to an increasing number of corruption scandals in China. It is making an 
effort to catch “tigers and flies”, public officials big and smalls. However, China 2014 
CPI score still shows a downward trend compared to previous years, making it 
questionable whether their corruption efforts are working or not. According to Plipat 
(2014), recent corruption prosecutions in China are efforts only to “clamp down on 
political opponents of the regime as opposed to genuine anti-corruption commitments”. 
Nanayakkara (2014) listed reasons why corruption is getting worse in China, and the 
main reason is that Chinese government does not have enough transparency or 
accountability to detect and punish corruption. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results. (n.d.). In Transparency International online. 
Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results 
5 Corruption Perception Index is a measurement of how corrupt a country is perceived to be 
where 0 is very corrupt and 100 is very clean. 
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India, on the other hand, is also struggling with corruption despite significant 
improvement in engagement, innovation and civil participation. India’s political 
corruption comes from the inadequacy of structure of accountability, as well as 
transparency to detect corruption. The Transparency International warns that India, along 
with other South East Asian countries, needs stronger law enforcement to fight against 
corruption, as well as a protection policy for whistleblowers.  
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Economic growth has been driven by many factors. Many researches have proven 
that knowledge-based economies tend to grow faster as innovation capability is a critical 
factor to national economic growth (Porter, 1990). There is an undeniable fact about the 
possible correlation between innovation and growth, as Singh (2006) states: 
Radical innovations open up new opportunities and push the frontiers of 
knowledge, which dramatically alter the existing economic structure. Incremental 
innovations not only improve the practices of the existing technologies but are 
potent factor of diffusion of the radical innovation that engineer structural change 
in the economic system.  
 
Many countries now recognize the importance of research and development 
(R&D) and innovation as the driving competitive forces (Nelson, 1993). Thus, they start 
to foster and stimulate the national R&D and innovation system to aid the performance to 
its full potential. According to Singh (2006), developed countries’ national innovation 
systems are evolved without external intervention and political pressures. On the other 
hand, developing countries’ national innovation systems are “at their stage of infancy” 
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(Singh, 2006, p. 18) as they are still trying to create a system that encourages firms to be 
productive and competitive.  
In this context, many governments have executed policies to strengthen the 
growth of R&D and innovation, mostly through Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). This 
is because of the belief that researchers and investors will be encouraged to invest time 
and resources into research and innovations, if they know their results will be repaid 
adequately in the future. For instance, China and India, two superpower nations in Asian 
region whose average growths were approximately ten percent per year, credit most of 
their exponential growth to innovation capability, IPR and innovation policies (Fan, 
2008).  
Normally, it is assumed that R&D and economic growth has a positive 
relationship. Prodan’s (2005) study presents a regression model to test the correlation 
between the amount of R&D expenditure and the number of patent applications to 
economic growth. The author finds that there is a positive correlation, taking into account 
the time lag differences between countries on patent application. 
Kuroiwa et al. (2011) showed that China, Japan and Korea achieved their current 
economic state by completely transforming their economic system to focus on 
technology. This economic renewal has significantly upgraded their economic systems to 
a whole new level, allowing them to maximize their competitive advantage and produce 
the most outputs possible. From the 1970s to 2000s, Japan’s economic strength changed 
from electronics components, semiconductors to electronic circuits, and communication 
technologies. Likewise, China changed from processing industry in 1990s to electronic 
and circuits and communication technologies in 2000s. Korea showed a dramatic shift in 
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its technological specialization in 1980s from lighting, steam generation and heating to 
electronics components semiconductors in 2000s.  
Even though it has been successful for some countries to completely switch to 
technological manufacturing, other countries struggle to find their competitive advantage. 
It is commonly believed that developing countries should imitate growth models that 
were previously used by developed countries. However, through empirical research, it is 
“analytically wrong and empirically flawed to draw direct policy lessons or to develop 
models from Asia for other developing countries to imitate” (Hobday, 2011, p. 19). 
Hobday used examples from “the four Asian dragons” 6 and found that a country became 
developed by only using its own model which fits best with the country’s current 
economic conditions. The author believed that the development process and strategy must 
be individually crafted to best suit the nation’s natural and human resources, capabilities, 
institutions and external conditions, not “on the paths or models of previous 
industrializers” (Hobday, 2011, p. 17).  
Another study also agrees that a “one-size-fits-all” system of IPR is illusionary 
and can create detrimental social costs by “blocking the development of complimentary 
innovations or of better substitutes” (Vallée & Yildizoglu, 2006, p. 3). Hence, the authors 
suggest that models of innovation and of patenting must take into account the complexity 
and individuality of each country, such as global influences, national strength and 
weaknesses.  
On the other hand, besides R&D and innovation, economic growth can also be 
influenced by the institutional quality variables of a country. Institutional quality !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong 
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variables include control of corruption, government effectiveness, and political stability. 
Those institutional quality variables can influence innovation both domestically and 
internationally, and hence, change the economic growth.  
Corruptions appear in various forms: bribery, theft of public assets, or political 
patronage. It can be decentralized or centralized: occasional, incidental, or systematic. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) develops two 
types of hypothesis testing regarding the effects of corruption on economic growth. One 
is the “greasing the wheel” hypothesis, which predicts that corruption is beneficial for 
growth, and the other one is the “sand in the wheel” hypothesis, which says the opposite.  
The idea that corruption is undesirable to growth was pioneered by Mauro (1995). 
Mauro found a strong negative relationship between corruption and investment, which 
later extended directly to growth. Using an assembled data set from the Business 
International indices on corruption, red tape and judicial system from 1980 to 1983, 
Mauro proved that efficient government institutions foster economic growth. Mauro was 
also aware of the subjectivity of the variables, which claimed to be useful because 
subjectivity measures “investors’ perception of political uncertainty that determine the 
investment rate” (p. 690). Mauro concluded that there is a “negative association between 
corruption and investment, as well as growth, is significant in both a statistical and 
economic sense” (p. 705).  
Subsequently, other studies have confirmed Mauro’s results and extended to other 
macroeconomics variables, such as foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000) and 
productivity (Labsdorff, 2003). The general idea that corruption is detrimental to 
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investment and growth is also supported by Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), 
Wei (2000), and Méon and Sekkat (2005). 
Likewise, Kuroiwa et al. (2011) explains the growth in economies is due to the 
openness approach. Institutional openness, as opposed to corruption, would allow 
innovative collaborations between companies, universities, and public research institutes. 
Furthermore, the reasons why countries like China, Japan and Korea could develop at an 
exponential rate are due to ample supply of human capital, research capabilities and large 
firms that are encouraging innovation and R&D. In order to protect the rapid growth rate, 
Asian countries should ensure that IPR are well enforced and consistent among the 
countries. They should also together develop common regulations and standards in 
emerging fields to encourage collaborations among countries. 
However, when looking at the “grease the wheel” hypothesis that states 
corruption is beneficial for growth, the hypothesis shows different patterns of corruption 
effects. The hypothesis, proposed by Leff (1964), Leys (1965) and Huntington (1968), 
stated that corruption might be beneficial in a second-best perspective. That is, 
“corruption, though generally detrimental to macroeconomic growth, can increase overall 
efficiency in the presence of deeper distortions, such as a rigid and over centralized 
administration, excessive regulatory barriers, or poorly efficient and weakly competent 
bureaucracies” (Hanoteau and Vial, 2010, p. 694).  
Moreover, the hypothesis postulates a scenario for an inefficient bureaucracy that 
poses an impediment to economic development, “some ‘speed’ or ‘grease’ money may 
help circumvent” (Méon and Weill, 2008, p. 5). In brief, the hypothesis implies that 
corruption can in fact serve as a trouble-saving device, which will eventually raise 
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efficiency, investment and hence, economic growth. This perspective disproves Mauro’s 
hypothesis. 
The one popular explanation for the “grease the wheels” phenomenon suggest that 
bribes can work as a means of insurance for foreign and domestic investments, 
encouraging investors to spend their money in the country (Leff, 1964). In addition, bribe 
can reduce the negative impacts of regulations (Hanoteau and Vial, 2010), as well as long 
administrative delays (Lui, 1985). Leys (1965) said that bribes give bureaucrats incentive 
to speed up processing time and cut down the amount of unnecessary red tape. For 
instance, in an effort to fight and prevent corruption in India, the Indian government 
found that corrupt officials might deliberately cause delays in order to attract more bribes 
from investors and businesses that would want to speed up the process (Myrdal, 1968).  
The “grease the wheel” corruption hypothesis is particularly applicable in the 
Asian region. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) called this the “Asian experience”. The “Asian 
experience” explains that corruption does not seem to hamper business in Asian countries 
due to a recognized corruption culture. Noticeably, panel data studies show that large, 
more developed countries suffer less from the effect of corruption, while smaller, less 
developed countries will face more detrimental effects from corruption activities. Rock 
and Bonnett (2004) suggested that “corruption is likely to be much more damaging to 
investment and growth in small, as opposed to large, developing countries”.  
For instance, newly industrializing economies, such as Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia, enjoy a high growth and investment rate. Meanwhile, South East Asian 
countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, have a high level of corruption, but low 
rate of growth and investment. In their 2010 study, Hanoteau and Vial (2010) found that 
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even though Indonesian firms pay bribes to the corrupted system, their favorable returns, 
such as reduced taxes, delays, red tape and civil servant harassments, or exclusive rights 
to license and contracts, are not sufficient and hence do not have an instantaneous impact 
on output and productivity. 
Bonnet and Rock (2004) explained that corruption could grease the wheels of 
growth due to large internal markets and supplies of labors. This means that foreign 
investors are more likely to accept corruption as a price, regardless of the high level of 
corruption, if they really want to have access to business in the country. Moreover, 
international institutions, regional development banks and bilateral aid donors may have 
more motivation to focus their anti-corruption programs on smaller activities, partially 
because it is more difficult to reform corrupted governance system in large countries 
(Bonnet and Rock, 2004). 
In brief, there is an adequate amount of scholarly work in the field that supports 
the view that corruption can actually have beneficial effects for economic growth in some 
countries. The “grease the wheel” hypothesis works well for some countries with a more 
centralized government system, a highly recognized corruption culture, and abundant 
economic resources. Bonnet and Rock (2004) confirmed that the “sand the wheel” 
hypothesis is not necessarily true in every country as corruption may slow growth and 
reduce investment in most small developing countries, but not in large, newly 
industrializing economies.  
However, there are not many studies that focus on how corruption can encourage 
innovation and growth. This study hopes to see the relationship between corruption and 
innovation, which will eventually explain the exponential growth in some Asian 
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countries, such as Korea, China and Japan. It is also striving to look at why such culture 
of corruption works well in those countries, while the same culture destroy the economic 
systems in others. The study will use economic panel data from official sources and 
historical evidences to answer the question raised above. 
4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data, explanation, sources, table 
The study collects panel data from 1996 to 2013 of seventeen countries from 
South East Asian, East Asian and Central Asian. Due to some data limitation, the data set 
excludes data from the following countries: Bhutan, Korean Democrat Republic (North 
Korea), Myammar, Nepal, Tibet, Taiwan and East Timor (Timor Leste).  
As mentioned above in Section 3, the impact of institutional quality variables on 
growth and innovation depends on the governmental effectiveness and corruption system. 
With that said, Table 1 presents a two-by-two table of possible outcomes based on 
different combinations of government effectiveness and organization of corruption 
system. Government effectiveness uses GDP per capita (GPC) as a proxy to look at how 
governments create wealth for individuals in the country. Effective governments is 
assumed be able to generate more than $10,000 GPC per year. Organization of corruption 
network uses the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a proxy. If CPI is below 40, then 
the country has a recognized corruption network and vice versa. 
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Table 1. Government Effectiveness and Organization of Corruption Combinations7 
Organization 
of Corruption 
Network 
Government Effectiveness 
Low GPC 
(Below $10,000) 
High GPC 
(Above $10,000) 
Strong 
centralized and 
recognized 
corruption 
network 
(Low CPI 
below 40) 
The effects of corruption on growth 
are expected to be negative or no 
change because those countries 
already suffer from inefficient 
government management. Thus, 
corruption would either worsen the 
situation, or create no change. 
The effects of corruption on growth 
would be positive. Those countries 
have huge economic resources for 
businesses to use as well as 
recognized corruption cultures. 
Businesses are willing to pay bribe 
to have access to the resources.  
Bangladesh (25) 
Cambodia (21) 
Indonesia (34) 
Lao (25) 
Mongolia (39) 
Philippines (38) 
Thailand (38) 
Vietnam (31) 
China (36) 
Malaysia (52) 
Korea (55) 
Macao (51) 
India (38) 
 
 
Less 
recognized 
corruption 
network or 
corruption 
network is 
non-exist 
(High CPI 
above 40) 
The effects of corruption on growth 
will be negative. 
The effects of corruption on growth 
would be negative because those 
countries have already successfully 
battled corruption and achieved a 
higher standard of living. Any 
corruption activities will push them 
backwards. 
No specific country found in this 
category. 
Brunei (60) 
Hong Kong (74) 
Japan (76) 
Singapore (84) 
Note: Number in the bracket ( ) next to each country is its 2013’s CPI statistics 
Data were obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) by the World 
Bank, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
International Database, the World Governance Indicator and the Transparency 
International Database website. Summary statistics for the data are provided in Table 2, 
Table 3 and Table 4 below. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The table is adapted from Rock and Bonnett’s study (2004) 
Innovation and Institutional Quality on Economic Growth in Asia 
Senior Capstone Project for Nguyen Tran-Nguyen 
! 17 
4.2 Empirical Model!
Following the model provided by Kowalski (2000), this study adapted the model 
by using some of the variables in the original regression model to estimate economic 
growth. Additional variables, such as education, innovation variables and corruption 
variables, are added in order to best suit the hypothesis. 
The model could be written as follow: 
GROWTHit  = β0  + β1 GPC + β2 EDUGDP + β3 FDI + β4 POP + β5TRADE + 
β6 PATENTN + β7 PATENTR + β8 RDE + β9 RESEA + β10 TRADEMN + β11TRADEMR + 
β12CC + β13 GE + β14 POLSTA + β15CPI + u
 
In the regression stated above, the dependent variable GROWTHit is the rate of 
growth of a country i at year t. Growth refers to a “purely statistical estimation of changes 
in GDP data” (Anand et al., 2014). Hence, the variable percentage of GDP growth is 
served as a proxy to see how fast or slow a country is developing economically.  
Independent variables consist of fifteen variables obtained from various data 
sources. Appendix A will provide more detail about the data source, acronyms, 
description, expected signs and justification for usage.  
4.2.1 Economic Growth Variables  
First, GPC represents GDP per capita in different countries. Second, EDUGE is 
public spending on education as percentage of government expenditure. Third, FDI 
represents the net inflow of foreign direct investment in the country. POP looks at 
population growth as annual percentage. And TRADE looks at the openness of trade of 
the country to foreign investors; it is calculated by dividing the sum of exports and 
imports of goods over GDP. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Economic Growth Variables 
Variables Observation Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GROWTH 306 5.388116     4.401301  -13.12672 27.49896 
GPC 306 11512.28 15477.35 246.1455 91376.02 
EDUGDP 306  3.450764    1.349857        0.34 9.35011 
FDI 306  1.57e+10 4.22e+10 -4.55e+09 3.48e+11 
POP 306 1.388099 306.7976503 -1.476362 5.321578 
TRADE 306 124.5055 99.55762 18.75639 458.3322 
4.2.2 Innovation Variables  
Innovation is calculated is by looking at the number of new patents issued each 
year, the amount of R&D expenditure spent, the number of scientific research conducted 
per year, or number of scientists in the country (Fan, 2008). For innovation variables, this 
study uses four variables.  
First, PATENT is the number of patent applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty to ask for protection of ideas for up to 20 years. PATENTN is the 
number of patent applications from non-residents, and PATENTR is the number of 
applications from residents. Second, RDE shows the amount of research and development 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Variable RESEA shows the number of researchers 
and scientists in the country. Lastly, TRADEM shows the number of trademark 
applications with a national or regional Intellectual Property office. TRADEMR are 
trademark applications from domestic applicants, and the other TRADEMN are 
applications filed by applicants from abroad.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics on Innovation Variables 
Variables Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
PATENTN 306 12371.94 21743.05 0 128072.3 
PATENTR 306 36160.34 99485.15 0 656983 
RDE 306 0.7475464 1.03886 0 4.64195 
RESEA 306 1119.232 1818.306 0 6883.037 
TRADEMN 306 10386.06 14610.03 277 137675.8 
TRADEMR 306 59501.44 185237.8 10 1794446 
4.2.3 Institutional Quality Variables  
For institutional quality variables, this study also incorporates four different 
variables that would help explain the relationship between corruption and economic 
growth. CC is Control of Corruption, capturing the “perceptions to which public power is 
used for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption”8. The variable 
GE captures perceptions of government effectiveness. The third variable POLSTA 
reflects the perceptions of the likelihood of whether the government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. All variables CC, GE, and POLSTA 
are measured in percentile rank where 0 as the lowest and 100 as the highest.  
The last variable CPI represents the Corruption Perception Index, collected and 
published by Transparency International. According to the organization, CPI is based on 
perception because corruption activities are deliberately hidden, and by “capturing 
perceptions of corruption [...] is the most reliable method of comparing relative 
corruption levels across countries”9.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Definition is provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
9 Explanation is given by the Transparency Index’s FAQ #2: Why Is The CPI Based On 
Perceptions? 
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Data for four institutional quality variables are collected from the World 
Governance Indicators and from the Transparency International websites. Variables CC, 
GE and POLSTA are all collected from the World Governance Indicator Database so they 
are highly correlated. However, the CPI and the World Governance Indicators’ indices 
aggregate two different sets of indicators using two different methods10. Hence, those 
variables complement each other. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics on Institutional Quality Variables 
Variables Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CC 306 50.5001 27.45381 2.926829 98.57143 
GE 306 59.37917 25.19012 10.2439 100 
POLSTA 306 48.41274 28.1031 2.884615 97.11539 
CPI 306 40.96405 21.43175 4 94 
5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the regressions, descriptions and explanations 
for their significance. 
In order to test the “grease the wheel” hypothesis on corruption and innovation, 
this study runs different regressions on three different data sets. One set uses data from all 
Asian countries. The second set is comprised of developing countries with GPC under 
$10,000. Those countries include: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Laos, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The third data set is comprised of developed 
countries with GPC over $10,000, including data from Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Macao, Malaysia and Singapore.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Meon and Weill (2008) descriptions of the composition of each indicators, based on the study 
of Lambsdorff (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
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In each data set, we study the interaction between a different dimension of 
institutional quality variables and innovation variables on economic growth. For each of 
the four institutional quality variables, the relationship is estimated twice to see whether 
those variables are correlated. According to the results, three out of four institutional 
quality variables are statistically insignificant except for CPI variable. However, if each 
institutional quality variable is put in the regression, it is significant at the 1% level of 
significance. 
5.1 Findings 
Since this study uses panel data, we run the regressions in Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS), Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM). FEM takes into 
consideration the impact of country effects, while REM looks at time effects. Results of 
OLS regressions are shown in Table 5 and Table 6, followed by results of FEM 
regressions in Table 7 and 8, and then results of REM regressions in Table 9 and 10.  
All FEM and REM regression models are ran on the same manner as OLS 
regressions. We also did the Hausman Test to see which regression model would be the 
most accurate to use in this panel, which results are shown in Table 11 and Table 12. The 
Chi-square value shows that FEM is the best to use given the panel data this study is 
using. 
Overall, all OLS, FEM, and REM regression results consistently point to the same 
direction. This has further confirmed the hypothesis that institutional quality variables 
can influence economic growth through innovation. Using regression results from FEM 
regressions, it is shown that corruption in some countries with a developed economy and 
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technology system can be beneficial. On the other hand, corruption can be detrimental to 
some newly developing countries. In addition, as a whole, innovations do have impacts 
on economic development, but not significant. The numbers of patent and trademark 
applications, both domestically and internationally, have a positive correlation to growth 
for all Asian countries. However, if looking into different sub groups of developing 
countries and developed countries, statistical results show that applications from 
nonresidents seem to do more harm than good in some developing countries.  
At first glance, the estimated coefficients result in the way they were expected. In 
addition, estimated coefficients are quite similar to those reported in other literature, 
despite some differences in the coefficient results of independent variables chosen. 
Overall, there is a positive correlation between institutional quality variables and 
economic growth in Asian countries. This means that a point increase in institutional 
quality variable ranking, there is a one percent decrease in GDP growth rate. This is 
consistent with economic theories about the effects of institutional performance of 
economic growth. The coefficient results for developing countries are also similar. For 
each point increase in the percentile ranking for GE and CPI, meaning that the country is 
doing better in battling corruption, there is a percent increase in GDP growth.  
However, for coefficient results for developed countries, the results confirm the 
hypothesis that some developed Asian countries are immune from corruption behaviors. 
The results display in Table 6 for developed countries show a negative correlation 
between institutional quality variables and economic growth. This means that a point in 
crease in any of the institutional quality variables (CC, GE, POLSTA or CPI) would result 
in a percent decrease in GDP growth. This implies that any attempt to improve or change 
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the corruption system in developed Asian countries may result in an unfavorable effect in 
economic growth, and corruption activities in developed countries have been beneficial 
for the economy. 
There is a positive correlation between institutional quality variables and 
innovation variables. An increase in perception of institutional performance would lead to 
an increase in the number of innovations, which would therefore lead to an increase in 
economic performance. However, there are some interesting relationships that appear in 
the regression results for the correlation between innovation variables and economic 
growth. 
Interestingly, there are opposite directions on the effect of innovation variables on 
economic growth in developing countries and developed countries. The number of patent 
applications from non-residents (PATENTN) is negatively correlated with growth for 
developing countries but is positively correlated with growth for developed countries. On 
the other hand, the number of patent applications from residents (PATENTR) the result is 
the opposite. Developing countries show a positive correlation between PATENTR and 
growth (significant at 10% level), while developed countries show a negative correlation 
(significant at 5% level).  
The correlation between the numbers of trademark applications (TRADEM) also 
shows the same patterns. The numbers of trademark applications from non-residents 
(TRADEMN) is negatively correlated with growth in developing countries, but positively 
correlated with growth in developed countries. In contrast, the number of trademark 
applications from residents (TRADEMR) is the opposite. It is positively correlated 
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(significant at 5% level) with growth in developing countries, but negatively correlated 
(significant at 5% level) with growth in developed countries.  
These results are showing growth patterns in those Asian countries. For 
developing countries, they do not have a centralized and well-governed system for 
control of corruption or government effectiveness. Hence, even if investors come to 
invest in those countries, they tend to leave without transferring the technology and 
knowledge over to the country. Multinational corporations who come to work in 
developing countries would create short-term growth, but not long-term growth for the 
economy. They take and exploit what they need, and then leave the country when the 
opportunities are no longer lucrative. Most developing countries would benefit more from 
an increase in intellectual contributions of their direct residents through various means: 
education, R&D or protection for domestic intellectual properties.  
On the other hand, developed countries show different growth patterns. 
Developed countries with a more centralized, systematic network of corruption tend to 
benefit from such a network. Multinational corporations and foreign investors come into 
the market, create wealth and knowledge, and then transfer the technology and 
knowledge over to the country after they leave. Developed countries have the technology 
and infrastructure needed to transfer and obtain new technology, and then regenerate the 
knowledge to benefit their economies further. Case studies about institutional quality 
control in South Korea and the Philippines will better illustrate this topic in the section 
below.   
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5.2 Case Studies 
5.2.1 South Korea 
Governments in developed countries have been successful at using corruption 
networks to enhance investment and growth by exercising monopoly control. From 1961 
to 1979, President Park Chung-Hee’s regime held strong autonomous government that 
gave out favorable patronage to firms that prove efficient. Over that period, South Korea 
celebrated high economic growth.  
President Park admired the leaders of the Meiji Restoration and the idea of 
cultivating a close link between national security, economic development and social 
cohesion. During his time, President Park has successfully established the framework of 
the Korean political economy and “nationalized” corruption system in which the state set 
the parameters of where corruption takes place. As a result, corruption functions as a 
dynamic part of the developmental process and corruption coexists with economic 
development.  
President Park was known for picking winners, and “firms needed to be efficient 
because they would have to perform to receive further support, and would have to pay a 
percentage of their assistance back to the state in the form of political funds” (Moran, 
1999, p. 571). Corruption in this sense is “productive” as political favors were not 
granted based on political patronage, but on the potential of economic performance. 
Firms that want support from President Park need to prove that they are capable of 
achieving his goals in return for political favors. For instance, companies like Hyundai 
and Daewoo received extensive support in return for their abilities to achieve President 
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Park’s targets. Chung Ju Yung, founder of Hyundai, excelled at developing the 
construction industry and shipbuilding industry in Korea, while Kim Woo-choong, 
founder and chairman of Daewoo, successfully reformed the loss-making industry. 
5.2.2 The Philippines 
The Philippines’s economic development story has taken an opposite direction to 
that of South Korea. Its political economy have provided the context for corruption and 
prevented the transformation of the state in a more efficient direction, especially during 
President Ferdinand Marco’s era. From 1965 to 1986, the Philippines were under the rule 
of Marcos, who is infamously known for his practice of corruption, extravagance and 
brutality. Statistically, for a twenty-five-year period from 1965 to 1989, the Philippines 
could only manage an average annual gross growth rate of 1.6 percent per year, as 
compared with its neighbors with an average rate of 4.2 percent. The impact of this 
sluggish corruption structure continues even in the post-Marcos era. Rapid improvements 
in some areas occurred after Marco resigned, but the Philippine’s overall economic 
development is generally disappointing.  
When Ferdinand Marco was in power, he used his martial powers to facilitate 
centralization to his favor. This dictatorship regime was exploited to distribute political 
and economic resources. If in South Korea, favorable treatment was given in return for 
economic development; then in the Philippines, favorable treatment was given for the 
development of cronyism. During his office time, Marcos strengthened his supporters’ 
control, corrupted the military, and stole a considerable amount of wealth from the 
country. To this day, investigators are still having difficulty determining precisely how 
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much money was stolen by Marcos (Mydan, 1991). It is estimated that approximately 
21.6 billion U.S Dollars, adjusted for inflation in 2014, was stolen. 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
In summary, the study found contradicting effects of institutional quality variables 
on innovation and economic growths in South East Asia and East Asia countries. Those 
measures differ in different government systems, as foreign investors react differently to 
developing countries and to developed countries.  
For developed countries with a well-established corruption system, the results 
supported the “grease the wheel” hypothesis. In which developed countries benefit from 
transferrable technology and knowledge from foreign investors even if they have a high 
level of corruption and government inefficiency. It is concluded that corruption and 
institutional factors in those countries have assumed a developed form. Anti-corruption 
reforms will be heavily dependent upon commitment of political elites and society 
groups, yet it does not guarantee that corruption will be completely abolished. It is argued 
that corruption could possibly be controlled, but not destroyed entirely. 
Vice versa, for developing countries, the results supported the classic theory that 
corruption is detrimental to growth. Any attempt to improve the government 
effectiveness and corruption problems would lead to a positive change in economic 
performance.  
However, this study does not intend to argue that corruption is a good thing for a 
country. Even though in some country, corruption and government inefficiencies provide 
a pole of mobilization for civil society groups; however, this study does not recommend 
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it as a policy option to other countries. The dynamics of corruption depend on different 
important factors such as national political economy, state ideology and autonomy, as 
well as external linkages and pressures.  
Instead, this study expects to highlight the differences from a macro-level 
perspective to show that some countries may benefit from ineffective institutional quality 
variables at the expense of others. In addition, the study is aware of possible perception 
biases, given that institutional quality variables are from an index rating. To look at the 
topic further, a counterfactual approach could give more insights about the effects of 
corruption on economic development. A study on innovation outputs and economic 
performance achieve in a purely competitive, corrupt-free country could give another 
view in this topic.  
Yet, this study still provides valuable information about the impact of institutional 
quality variables on innovation and economic development. From a policy-perspective, it 
is important for governments to examine their current condition individually. Programs 
designed to fight corruption and institution inefficiencies must take into consideration the 
different structural factors and corruption effects on their own country’s economic 
development.  
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*, **, *** Denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. !
Table 5. OLS Test Regression Equations For All Developing Countries and All Developed Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH (Developing Countries) GROWTH (Developed Countries)!
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 1! 2! 3! 4! 5!
GPC 0.0009*** (2.61) 
0.0008*** 
(2.60) 
0.0009*** 
(2.71) 
0.0008*** 
(2.63) 
0.0008*** 
(2.60) 
0.0001** 
(2.19)! 0.0001** (2.51) 0.0001 (1.44) 0.0001** (2.26) 0.0001** (2.06) 
EDUGDP -0.8678*** (-3.07) 
-0.6773** 
(-2.26) 
-0.7390** 
(-2.43) 
-0.9154*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.8683*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.5472 
(-1.27)! -0.7418* (-1.68) -0.7204 (-1.63) -0.6087 (-1.39) -0.7578* (-1.87) 
FDI 0.0000 (0.11) 
0.0000 
(0.17) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
0.0000 
(-0.57)! -0.0000 (-0.91) -0.0000 (-0.43) -0.0000 (-0.60) -0.0000 (-1.13) 
POP 0.6255 (0.88) 
0.7390 
(1.05) 
0.6676 
(0.94) 
0.6592 
(0.92) 
0.6056 
(0.85) 
0.4746 
(0.88)! 0.3139 (0.58) 0.3223 (0.59) 0.4518 (0.84) 0.4011 (0.79) 
TRADE 0.0272*** (3.04) 
0.0256*** 
(2.87) 
0.0251*** 
(2.75) 
0.0256*** 
(2.65) 
0.0279*** 
(3.02) 
-0.0044 
(-0.53)! 0.0107 (0.89) -0.0166 (-1.47) -0.0028 (-0.34) 0.0241** (2.40) 
PATENTN -0.0003* (-1.54) 
-0.0003 
(-1.52) 
-0.0003 
(-1.21) 
-0.0003 
(-1.55) 
-0.0003 
(-1.51) 
0.0001 
(0.98)! 0.0003 (0.63) 0.0005 (0.98) 0.0004 (0.83) 0.0001* (1.65) 
PATENTR 0.0011 (1.27) 
0.0013 
(1.47) 
0.0009 
(1.13) 
0.0011 
(1.26) 
0.0011 
(1.26) 
0.0000*** 
(-3.30)! -0.0001 (-1.21) -0.0003 (-3.66)*** -0.0002*** (-2.55) -0.0001 (-1.36) 
RDE 3.9152* (1.75) 
4.4007** 
(1.97) 
4.1085* 
(1.83) 
3.9259* 
(1.75) 
4.0444* 
(1.78) 
0.3035 
(0.17)! 0.5288 (0.31) -0.0512 (-0.03) -0.1024 (-0.06) -0.0904 (-0.06) 
RESEA -0.0071* (-1.38) 
-0.0051 
(-0.97) 
-0.0049 
(-0.90) 
-0.0067 
(-1.30) 
-0.0070 
(-1.37) 
-0.0002 
(-0.22)! -0.0003 (0.27) -0.0001 (-0.10) 0.0001 (0.01) 0.0003 (0.36) 
TRADEMN -0.0002 (0.96) 
-0.0023** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.05) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.19) 
0.0002 
(-0.08)! 0.0002* (1.76) 0.0002** (2.16) 0.0002 (-0.85) 0.0001 (1.53) 
TRADEMR 0.0001** (-2.18) 
0.0001 
(0.53) 
0.0002 
(0.83) 
0.0002 
(0.96) 
0.0002 
(1.26) 
0.0009** 
(1.94)! -0.0000 (-0.27) 0.0000** (2.16) 0.0000 (1.49) -0.0000 (1.53) 
CC  
-0.0377* 
(-1.80)    ! -0.1223* (-1.70)    
GE   
-0.0294 
(-1.14)   !  0.1457 (1.58)   
POLSTA    
0.0073 
(0.44)  !   -0.0342 (-0.85)  
CPI     
-0.0156 
(-0.34) !    -0.1942*** (-4.44) 
Constant 5.2971 5.5598 5.8474 5.1955 5.6079 3.5803! 10.6841 -4.6512 6.1533 9.7245 
Obs 162 162 162 162 162 144! 144 144 144 144 
R2 0.2683 0.2838 0.2746 0.2692 0.2689 0.2349! 0.2515 0.2492 0.2391 0.3351 
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Table 6. OLS Test Regression Equations For All Asian Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 
GPC 0.00003* (1.32) 
0.0001*** 
(3.37) 
0.0001*** 
(3.22) 
0.00002 
(1.36) 
0.00007*** 
(3.15) 
EDUGDP -0.5745*** (-2.55) 
-0.4059* 
(-1.81) 
-0.3137 
(-1.35) 
-0.5535** 
(-2.40) 
-0.5536** 
(-2.57) 
FDI 0.00000 (0.52) 
0.0000 
(0.23) 
0.0000 
(0.18) 
0.00000 
(0.50) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
POP 0.06763 (0.17) 
0.1811 
(0.47) 
0.2985 
(0.76) 
0.0663 
(0.17) 
0.1752 
(0.46) 
TRADE 0.00452 (0.81) 
0.0141** 
(2.35) 
0.0099* 
(1.75) 
0.0055 
(0.91) 
0.0248*** 
(3.79) 
PATENTN 0.00002 (0.42) 
0.0003 
(0.83) 
0.0004 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(0.44) 
0.0001 
(1.57) 
PATENTR -0.0002*** (-2.83) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0001*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.0002** 
(-1.98) 
RDE 1.77169* (1.46) 
2.7113** 
(2.24) 
2.3158* 
(1.93) 
1.8006* 
(-1.74) 
2.2545* 
(1.94) 
RESEA -0.00117** (-1.70) 
-0.0016** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0014** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0012 
(1.59) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.70) 
TRADEMN -0.00008* (-1.40) 
-0.0004 
(-0.79) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0001 
(-1.46) 
-0.0007 
(-1.35) 
TRADEMR 0.00010* (1.55) 
0.0000 
(0.92) 
0.0000 
(0.82) 
0.0000 
(1.59) 
0.0000 
(1.03) 
CC  
-0.0718*** 
(-3.90)    
GE   
-0.0701*** 
(-3.55)   
POLSTA    
-0.0061 
(-0.43)  
CPI     
-0.1451*** 
(-5.35) 
Constant 6.79892 7.2433 7.6423 6.8901 8.5483 
Obs 306 306 306 306 306 
R2 0.1529 0.1948 0.1878 0.1535 0.2284 
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Table 7. Fixed Effect Model (FEM) Regression Equations For All Developing Countries and All Developed Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH (Developing Countries) GROWTH (Developed Countries)!
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 1! 2! 3! 4! 5!
GPC 0.0018*** (4.58) 
0.0018*** 
(4.44) 
0.0019*** 
(4.90) 
0.0019*** 
(4.68) 
0.0018*** 
(4.44) 
0.0001** 
(2.38)! 0.0001** (2.18)! 0.0001 (1.52)! 0.0001** (2.54)! 0.0001** (2.18) 
EDUGDP -0.7997** (-2.40) 
-0.7988** 
(-2.38) 
-0.9526*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.8264** 
(-2.47) 
-0.7845** 
(-2.36) 
-0.7227 
(-1.22)! -0.6471 (-1.09)! -0.5936 (-1.07)! -0.5847 (-1.04)! -0.7198 (-1.21) 
FDI 0.0000 (-0.43) 
0.0000 
(-0.40) 
0.0000 
(-0.77) 
0.0000 
(-0.48) 
0.0000 
(-0.58) 
0.0000 
(-0.62)! 0.0000 (-0.41)! 0.0000 (-0.17)! 0.0000 (-0.46)! 0.0000 (-0.56) 
POP 1.3959** (1.60) 
1.4029 
(1.57) 
1.4959*** 
(1.74) 
1.0651 
(1.14) 
1.7551* 
(1.92) 
-0.0932 
(-0.16)! -0.0044 (-0.01) -0.2631 (-0.48) -0.1328 (-0.24) -0.0682 (-0.12) 
TRADE 0.0393** (2.09) 
0.0393** 
(2.08) 
0.0408** 
(2.19) 
0.0353* 
(1.83) 
0.0404** 
(2.15) 
0.0239 
(1.58)! 0.0189 (1.24) 0.0058 (0.39) 0.0093 (0.63) 0.0226 (1.40) 
PATENTN -0.0002 (-0.58) 
-0.0001 
(-0.58) 
-0.0001 
(-0.56) 
-0.0002 
(-0.66) 
-0.0002 
(-0.62) 
0.0001 
(0.85)! 0.0001 (1.08) -0.0001 (-0.35) 0.0001 (1.08) 0.0001 (0.76) 
PATENTR 0.0013 (0.97) 
0.0013 
(0.96) 
0.0013 
(0.98) 
0.0013 
(1.00) 
0.0014 
(1.07) 
0.0000 
(-0.18)! -0.0000 (-0.40) -0.0000 (-0.62) -0.0000 (-0.50) -0.0000 (-0.20) 
RDE 1.4581 (0.45) 
1.4565 
(0.44) 
2.4149 
(0.74) 
1.6695 
(0.51) 
1.4602 
(0.45) 
-3.5592 
(-1.35)! -3.4177 (-1.31) -4.0776* (-1.65) -0.9367 (-0.37) -3.7509 (-1.36) 
RESEA -0.0003 (-0.03) 
-0.0003 
(-0.03) 
-0.0004 
(-0.05) 
0.0048 
(0.48) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
0.0005 
(0.52)! 0.0005 (0.47) 0.0004 (0.39) -0.0005 (-0.48) 0.0006 (0.56) 
TRADEMN -0.0002 (-1.38) 
-0.0002 
(-1.37) 
-0.0002 
(-1.40) 
-0.0002 
(-0.58) 
-0.0002 
(-1.29) 
0.0001 
(0.42)! 0.0001 (0.61) 0.0001 (0.32) 0.0001 (0.85) 0.0001 (0.45) 
TRADEMR -0.0001 (-0.60) 
-0.0002 
(-0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-0.48) 
-0.0002 
(-0.58) 
-0.0002 
(-0.75) 
0.0000 
(0.06)! -0.0000 (-0.04) 0.0000 (0.59) -0.0000 (-0.20) 0.0000 (0.45) 
CC  
-0.0011 
(-0.04)    ! 0.1621* (1.77)    
GE   
0.1088** 
(2.01)   !  0.4247*** (4.34)   
POLSTA    
0.9255 
(0.40)  !   0.2217*** (4.10)  
CPI     
0.0769 
(1.29) !    0.0319 (0.25) 
Constant 1.5359 1.5626 -2.9056 0.9254 -1.0336 3.5735! -8.1846 -24.5367 -11.0550 2.1697 
Obs 162 162 162 162 162 144! 144 144 144 144 
R2 (Overall) 0.0731 0.0743 0.2530 0.0421 0.0665 0.0408! 0.1490 0.2425 0.1381 0.1279 
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Table 8. Fixed Effect Model (FEM) Regression Equations For All Asian Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 
GPC 0.00011*** (3.45) 
0.0001*** 
(3.44) 
0.0001*** 
(2.99) 
0.0001*** 
(3.51) 
0.0001*** 
(3.18) 
EDUGDP -0.4376 (-1.56) 
-0.4385 
(-1.56) 
-0.5230* 
(-1.89) 
-0.4934* 
(-1.76) 
-0.4361 
(-1.55) 
FDI 0.00000 (0.15) 
0.00000 
(0.15) 
0.00000 
(0.22) 
0.00000 
(0.09) 
0.00000 
(0.23) 
POP 0.0441 (0.10) 
0.0331 
(0.08) 
-0.0445 
(-0.10) 
-0.1176 
(-0.27) 
0.1388 
(0.31) 
TRADE 0.0268** (2.45) 
0.0268** 
(2.45) 
0.0214** 
(1.97) 
0.0256** 
(2.35) 
0.0247** 
(2.22) 
PATENTN 0.00002 (0.35) 
0.0001 
(0.37) 
-0.0001 
(-0.23) 
0.0001 
(0.33) 
0.0000 
(0.16) 
PATENTR -0.0000 (-0.86) 
-0.0000 
(-0.48) 
-0.0000 
(-0.70) 
-0.0000 
(-0.51) 
-0.0000 
(-0.47) 
RDE -1.6251 (-0.86) 
-1.5967 
(-0.84) 
-1.3604 
(-0.74) 
-0.6536 
(-0.34) 
-1.9212 
(-1.01) 
RESEA -0.0003 (-0.41) 
-0.0003 
(-0.43) 
-0.0005 
(-0.70) 
-0.0006 
(-0.86) 
-0.0002 
(-0.30) 
TRADEMN -0.00003 (-0.40) 
-0.0003 
(-0.36) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
-0.0001 
(-0.21) 
TRADEMR 0.0000 (0.46) 
0.0000 
(0.45) 
0.0000 
(0.62) 
0.0000 
(0.27) 
0.0000 
(-0.21) 
CC  
0.0111 
(0.34)    
GE   
0.1856*** 
(3.55)   
POLSTA    
0.0551** 
(2.20)  
CPI     
0.0636 
(1.07) 
Constant 3.7598 3.1890 -5.7325 1.1783 1.4790 
Obs 306 306 306 306 306 
R2 Overall 0.0208 0.0896 0.1288 0.01049 0.0930 
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*, **, *** Denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. !
Table 9. Random Effect Model (REM) Regression Equations For All Developing Countries and Developed Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH (Developing Countries) GROWTH (Developed Countries)!
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 1! 2! 3! 4! 5!
GPC 0.0008*** (2.61) 
0.0008*** 
(2.60) 
0.0008*** 
(2.71) 
0.0008*** 
(2.63) 
0.0008*** 
(2.60) 
0.0001** 
(2.19)! 0.0001** (2.51)! 0.0001 (1.44)! 0.0001** (2.26)! 0.0001** (2.06)!
EDUGDP -0.8677*** (-3.07) 
-0.6773** 
(-2.26) 
-0.7390** 
(-2.43) 
-0.9154*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.8683*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.5472 
(-1.27)! -0.7418* (-1.68)! -0.7204 (-1.63)! -0.6087 (-1.39)! -0.7578* (-1.87)!
FDI 0.0000 (0.11) 
0.0000 
(0.17) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
0.0000 
(-0.57)! 0.0000 (-0.91)! 0.0000 (-0.43)! 0.0000 (-0.60)! 0.0000 (-1.13)!
POP 0.6255 (0.88) 
0.7390 
(1.05) 
0.6677 
(0.94) 
0.6592 
(0.92) 
0.6055 
(0.85) 
0.4746 
(0.88)! 0.3139 (0.58)! 0.3225 (0.59)! 0.4517 (0.84)! 0.4011 (0.79)!
TRADE 0.0272*** (3.04) 
0.0256*** 
(2.87) 
0.0251** 
(2.75) 
0.0256*** 
(2.65) 
0.0279*** 
(3.02) 
-0.0044 
(-0.53)! 0.0107 (0.89)! -0.0167 (-1.47)! -0.0028 (-0.34) 0.0.241** (2.40) 
PATENTN -0.0003 (-1.54) 
-0.0003 
(-1.52) 
-0.0003 
(-1.21) 
-0.0003 
(-1.55) 
-0.0003 
(-1.51) 
0.0000 
(0.98)! 0.0000 (0.63) 0.0000 (0.98) 0.0000 (0.83) 0.0001* (1.65) 
PATENTR 0.0011 (1.27) 
0.0013 
(1.47) 
0.0009 
(1.13) 
0.0011 
(-1.26) 
0.0011 
(1.26) 
0.0000*** 
(-3.30)! -0.0000 (-1.21) -0.0000*** (-3.66) -0.0000** (-2.55) -0.0000 (-1.36) 
RDE 3.9151* (1.75) 
4.4007** 
(1.97) 
4.1085* 
(1.83) 
3.925* 
(1.75) 
4.0444* 
(1.78) 
0.3035 
(0.17)! 0.5287 (0.31) -0.0512 (-0.03) -0.1024 (-0.06) -0.0905 (-0.06) 
RESEA -0.0000 (-1.38) 
-0.0050 
(-0.97) 
-0.0049 
(-0.90) 
-0.0067 
(-1.30) 
-0.0070 
(-1.37) 
-0.0002 
(-0.22)! -0.0003 (-0.27) -0.0001 (-0.10) 0.0001 (0.01) 0.0003 (0.36) 
TRADEMN -0.0002** (-2.18) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.05) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.19) 
0.0002 
(-0.08)! 0.0002* (1.76) 0.0002 (2.16) 0.0001 (1.49) 0.0001 (1.53) 
TRADEMR 0.0000 (0.96) 
0.0000 
(0.53) 
0.0000 
(0.83) 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
0.0009* 
(1.94)! -0.0000 (-0.29) 0.0000 (0.13) 0.0000 (0.08) -0.0000 (-0.23) 
CC  
-0.03772* 
(-1.80)    ! -0.1227* (-1.70)    
GE   
-0.0294 
(-1.14)   !  0.1457 (1.58)   
POLSTA    
0.0073 
(0.44)  !   -0.0342 (-0.85)  
CPI     
-0.0156 
(-0.34) !    -0.1942*** (-4.44) 
Constant 5.2971 5.5598 5.8473 5.1955 5.6079 3.5803! 19.6840 -4.6512 6.1533 9.7246 
Obs 162 162 162 162 162 144! 144 144 144 144 
R2 Overall 0.2683 0.2838 0.2746 0.2692 0.2689 0.2349! 0.2515! 0.2492! 0.2391! 0.3351!
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*, **, *** Denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. !
Table 10. Random Effect Model (REM) Regression Equations For All Asian Countries 
Dependent Variable GROWTH 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 
GPC 0.0001** (2.53) 
0.0001*** 
(2.91) 
0.0001** 
(2.52) 
0.0001** 
(2.15) 
0.0001*** 
(3.05) 
EDUGDP -0.4411* (-1.72) 
-0.4398* 
(-1.75) 
-0.4261* 
(-1.66) 
-0.4625* 
(-1.82) 
-0.5274** 
(-2.21) 
FDI 0.00000 (0.59) 
0.00000 
(0.47) 
0.00000 
(0.55) 
0.00000 
(0.65) 
0.00000 
(0.24) 
POP -0.0071 (-0.02) 
0.0579 
(0.14) 
0.0177 
(0.04) 
-0.0162 
(-0.04) 
0.0011 
(0.00) 
TRADE 0.0023 (0.32) 
0.0072 
(0.98) 
0.0036 
(0.48) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0175** 
(2.26) 
PATENTN 0.0000 (0.65) 
0.0000 
(0.66) 
0.0000 
(0.72) 
0.0000 
(0.59) 
0.0000 
(1.16) 
PATENTR -0.0000** (-2.04) 
-0.0000** 
(-1.83) 
-0.0000** 
(-2.06) 
-0.0000** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0000** 
(-1.98) 
RDE 0.0357 (0.02) 
0.8361 
(0.59) 
0.2783 
(0.19) 
0.3122 
(0.22) 
1.5825 
(1.21) 
RESEA -0.0004 (-0.62) 
-0.0007 
(-0.98) 
-0.0005 
(-0.71) 
-0.0005 
(-0.71) 
-0.0008 
(-1.21) 
TRADEMN -0.00001 (-0.24) 
-0.0000 
(-0.12) 
-0.0000 
(-0.17) 
-0.0000 
(-0.22) 
-0.0000 
(-0.62) 
TRADEMR 0.0000 (-0.24) 
0.0000 
(0.43) 
0.0000 
(0.57) 
0.0000 
(0.76) 
0.0000 
(-0.62) 
CC  
-0.0452** 
(-2.05)    
GE   
-0.0175 
(-0.61)   
POLSTA    
0.0094 
(0.51)  
CPI     
-0.1157*** 
(-3.49) 
Constant 6.2401 7.3204 6.8148 6.2005 8.4678 
Obs 306 306 306 306 306 
R2 Overall 0.1103 0.4535 0.3418 0.2927 0.2191 
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 !
Table 11. Hausman-Test for Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model 
Dependent Variable GROWTH 
Regression OLS FEM REM 
GPC 0.0000882** (3.01) 
0.0000907** 
(2.62) 
0.0000882** 
(3.01) 
EDUGDP -0.518* (-2.22) 
-0.575* 
(-2.09) 
-0.518* 
(-2.22) 
FDI 1.24E-12 (0.06) 
6.70E-12 
(0.32) 
1.24E-12 
(0.06) 
POP 0.264 (0.69) 
0.0162 
(0.04) 
0.264 
(0.69) 
TRADE 0.0230*** (3.46) 
0.0161 
(1.46) 
0.0230*** 
(3.46) 
PATENTN 0.00007 (1.60) 
-0.00004 
(-0.69) 
0.00007 
(1.60) 
PATENTR -0.00001* (-2.31) 
-0.00001 
(-0.68) 
-0.00001* 
(-2.31) 
RDE 2.578* (2.18) 
-1.06855 
(-0.56) 
2.57803* 
(2.18) 
RESEA -0.00125 (-1.86) 
-0.00069 
(-0.86) 
-0.00125 
(-1.86) 
TRADEMN -0.00001 (-0.14) 
0.00003 
(0.44) 
0.00000 
(-0.14) 
TRADEMR 0.00000 (0.38) 
0.00000 
(0.38) 
-0.00000 
(0.38) 
CC -0.0299 (-0.88) 
-0.0620 
(-1.72) 
-0.0299 
(-0.88) 
GE -0.0155 (-0.50) 
0.198*** 
(3.56) 
-0.0155 
(1.63) 
POLSTA 0.0259 (1.63) 
0.0531* 
(2.03) 
0.0259 
(1.63) 
CPI -0.125*** (-3.83) 
0.108 
(1.79) 
-0.125*** 
(-3.83) 
Constant 8.295 -9.545 8.295 
Obs 306 306 306 
R2 0.241 0.006 0.241 
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Table 12. Hausman Test Results!
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (9) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems 
computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and 
possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
 
 ---- Coefficients ---- 
 (b) femodel 
(B) 
. 
(b-B) 
Difference 
Sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
S. E.  
GPC 0.0000907 0.0000882 2.48E-06 0.0000183 
EDUGDP -0.5747232 -0.5176392 -0.057084 0.1466998 
FDI 6.70E-12 1.24E-12 5.47E-12 2.06E-12 
POP 0.016197 0.2644478 -0.2482508 0.2195265 
TRADE 0.016126 0.023031 -0.006905 0.0088239 
PATENTN -0.0000373 0.0000696 -0.0001068 0.0000321 
PATENTR -0.0000118 -0.0000144 2.64E-06 0.0000162 
RDE -1.068546 2.57803 -3.646576 1.485246 
RESEA -0.0006864 -0.001249 0.0005626 0.0004386 
TRADEN 3.82E-06 2.50E-06 1.32E-06 7.76E-06 
TRADER 0.0000328 -8.82E-06 0.0000417 0.0000411 
CC -0.0619505 -0.0299371 -0.0320134 0.0120425 
GE 0.1977211 -0.0154876 0.2132087 0.046069 
POLSTA 0.053143 0.0258523 0.0272907 0.020907 
CPI 0.1083856 -0.125328 0.2337136 0.0507644 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=  30.71 
 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0003 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
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APPENDIX A: Variable Description and Data Sources !
ACRONYM DESCRIPTION DATA SOURCE 
GROWTH Annual percentage GDP growth 
based on local currency (constant 
2005 U.S. dollars) 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
GPC GDP per capita in current U.S 
Dollars 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
 
EDUGDP Public spending on education as 
percentage of GDP 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
FDI Net inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment in current U.S Dollars 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
POP Annual percentage growth in 
population growth 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
TRADE Trade openness is the sum of export 
and import as percent of GDP 
 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI) by the World Bank 
INNOVATION VARIABLES 
PATENTN Total number of patent applications 
from non residents (in thousands) 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and 
World Intellectual Property 
Indicators. 
 
PATENTR Total number of patent applications 
from residents (in thousands) 
 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and 
World Intellectual Property 
Indicators. 
 
RDE Total expenditures on research and 
development as percentage of GDP 
United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics and 
World Development Indicator 
 
RESEA Total number of researchers in R&D 
(per million people) 
 
United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics and 
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World Development Indicator 
 
TRADEMN 
 
Total number of trademark 
applications from direct nonresidents 
 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and 
World Intellectual Property 
Indicators. 
 
TRADEMR 
 
Total value of imports of goods and 
services as percentage of GDP 
 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and 
World Intellectual Property 
Indicators. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY VARIABLES 
CCRNK Control of corruption in percentile 
rank from 0 to 100 (0 is lowest rank, 
and 100 is highest rank) 
 
World Governance Indicators 
 
GERNK Government effectiveness in 
percentile rank from 0 to 100 (0 is 
lowest rank, and 100 is highest rank) 
 
World Governance Indicators 
 
POLSTA Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism measurement in 
percentile rank from 0 to 100 (0 is 
lowest rank, and 100 is highest rank) 
 
World Governance Indicators 
CPI Corruption Perception Index 
 
Transparency International 
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APPENDIX B. Variables and Expected Signs !
ACRONYM VARIABLE DESCRIPTION WHAT IT CAPTURES 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
GROWTH GDP growth (annual 
%) 
 
Annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency.  
 
N/A 
GPC GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
 
GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear 
population.  
 
+ 
EDUGDP Public spending on 
education (% of 
GDP) 
 
Public expenditure on education as 
percentage of GDP is the total 
public expenditure on education, 
expressed as a percentage. 
 
+ 
FDI Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (current 
US$) 
 
Net inflows FDI shows new 
investment inflows less 
disinvestment in the reporting 
economy from foreign investors.  
 
+ 
POP Population growth 
(annual %) 
 
Population growth is the 
exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 
to t. 
 
+ 
TRADE Trade openness Trade openness is calculated by 
finding the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
 
+ 
INNOVATION VARIABLES 
PATENTR Patent applications, 
residents 
 
Patent applications are filed 
through the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, providing protection for 
the invention to the owner of the 
patent for a limited period (20 
years). 
 
(+) for 
developed 
countries 
(-) for 
developing 
countries 
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PATENTN Patent applications, 
non residents 
 
Patent applications through the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
providing protection for the 
invention to the owner of the 
patent for a limited period (20 
years). 
 
(+) for 
developed 
countries 
(-) for 
developing 
countries 
RDE Research and 
development 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
 
Expenditures for research and 
development on creative work 
undertaken systematically to 
increase knowledge. R&D covers 
basic research, applied research, 
and experimental development. 
 
+ 
RESEA Researchers in R&D 
(per million people) 
 
Researchers in R&D are 
professionals engaged in the 
conception or creation of new 
knowledge, products, processes, 
methods, or systems and 
postgraduate PhD students 
engaged in R&D. 
 
+ 
TRADEMN 
 
Trademark 
applications, direct 
nonresident 
 
Direct nonresident trademark 
applications are those filed by 
applicants from abroad directly at 
a given national IP office. 
 
(+) for 
developed 
countries 
(-) for 
developing 
countries 
 
TRADEMR 
 
Trademark 
applications, direct 
resident 
 
Trademark applications filed are 
applications to register a 
trademark with a national or 
regional Intellectual Property (IP) 
office.  
Direct resident trademark 
applications are those filed by 
domestic applicants directly at a 
given national IP office. 
 
(+) for 
developed 
countries 
(-) for 
developing 
countries 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY VARIABLES 
CC Control of 
Corruption: 
Percentile Rank 
Control of Corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for 
+ 
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 private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests.  
Percentile rank: 0 (lowest rank) 
to100 (highest rank). 
 
GE Government 
Effectiveness: 
Percentile Rank 
 
Government Effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such 
policies. Percentile rank: 0 (lowest 
rank) to100 (highest rank). 
 
+ 
POLSTA Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 
Reflects perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. 
Percentile rank: 0 (lowest rank) 
to100 (highest rank). 
 
+ 
CPI Corruption 
Perception Index 
 
The CPI scores and ranks 
countries and/or territories based 
on how corrupt a country’s public 
sector is perceived to be.  
 
+ 
!
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